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The Functions of the Research Officer 
in Trade Unions 
Harry J. Waisglass 
The author exposes the union approach to research 
from the perspective of the research departmenfs func-
tions, distinguishing the functions of the research officers 
from their activities, their methods and techniques. 
The research job could be described simply and briefly in ternis 
of its activities, but the research function involves a considération of 
relationships: the varied and sometimes changing relationships which 
exist within the démocratie structure of the trade unions. 
The major activities of a union's research départaient generally 
reflect those of the organization. In the Canadian Labour Congress 
and its provincial fédérations the emphasis is on législative and political 
activities. In the industrial and craft unions the emphasis is on collective 
bargaining. 
In our union, the research work is aimed at the union's central pur-
pose: to grow in strength and influence as a démocratie organization 
with a mission to improve the lives of workers economically, socially 
and politically. 
The job of the research départaient is to provide ail levels and 
departments of the union with factual, technical and analytical infor-
mation so that they may carry out their responsibilities more effectively. 
While the research staff is involved in varying degrees in related fields 
of union activity such as éducation, welfare, public relations, community 
affairs, politics and législative présentations, the research services are 
concentrated mainly on providing assistance to the directors and staff 
in collective bargaining matters. 
The research départaient collects 
and analyzes collective agreements, 
information on wages and working 
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conditions, company financial reports, and économie conditions and trends 
in domestic and world markets. It helps to define bargaining goals, ad-
vises on bargaining stratégies and programs. The research staff assists 
in every phase of collective bargaining, from drafting proposais through 
the actual negotiations of the contracts on économie matters. It prépares 
and présents briefs to conciliation and arbitration boards. Specialized 
technical services and professional advice are provided on matters such 
as pensions, health and insurance plans, SUB, extended vacations, and 
severance plans. 
Organizers are provided with information to assist them in recruiting 
new members and extending récognition of the union as bargaining 
agent. 
Because our Union does not rely exclusively on collective bargaining 
to achieve its social and économie goals, considérable research support 
is given to its efforts to influence public policies toward a more équitable 
income distribution, économie planning for full employment, improved 
universal welfare and insurance schemes (such as pensions, medicare, 
sickness and unemployment insurance), and éducation and training 
programs for employed as well as displaced workers. Attention is given 
to présent and proposed législation in thèse fields. The social and 
économie problems of automation and technological change are also 
studied. Assistance is given to labour représentatives on various éco-
nomie and social planning bodies. 
While much of this work has become routine, formai and specialized, 
considérable attention, energy and interest are directed toward a search 
for new approaches to new and old problems. Survival and growth 
require adaptation. 
Elected officers expect to be kept alert to the dangers of 
stagnation by research professionals who are encouraged to question 
prevailing views and challenge traditional approaches within a frame-
work of loyalty to the union and dévotion to the labour movement. 
The elected officers expect the staff experts to anticipate the problems 
which may arise in the areas of their specialization, to draw attention 
to them and to propose new policy solutions. New ideas and investi-
gations initiated by the research départaient hâve led to such innovations 
as the Steelworkers' Group Health Centre at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. 
A research départaient must serve the union's aspirations and its 
activities are integrated with the union's activities. At the sarne time, 
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however, the research staff must be sufficiently detached from the 
operational and administrative functions to view them objectively and 
to provide an efficient, compétent and professional service. 
For professional practitioners this présents a dilemma — a dilemma 
analogous to the eternal line-staff conflict in management. In unions 
it strikes deeper — to the very heart of the vital principle of démocratie 
responsibility and control. The elected officers are responsible to the 
members for the union's policies and for the conduct of its affairs. The 
elected officers, not the research experts or other officiais, must answer 
to the members and account for policy and administrative décisions. 
At élections they will take crédit for successes, but they must also take 
the blâme for failures. 
Theoretically the professional staff are civil servants of the union 
and should continue to serve through changes in administration. In 
practice, however, the professionals tend to become more or less in-
volved in the decision-making processes and to become identified with 
the administration. This tendency is particularly évident in unions 
with weak leadership, where elected officers avoid their decision-making 
responsibilities, where they demand political loyalty from the profes-
sionals and active engagement against administration opponents. 
The temptation to usurp the decision-making authority of a weak, 
incompétent and ineffectuai leader may prove too strong for some 
professionals to resist. If the professional yields, it may gratify his ego, 
but his professional integrity and the démocratie union fabric will suffer 
as a conséquence. 
The function of the professional is to inform, teach, advise and 
assist the decision-makers. The actual decision-making must be left to 
those who are elected for that purpose. The professionaFs advisory 
function involves essentially a process of analysis, while decision-making 
is essentially a process of synthesis. In making a décision an officer 
must bring together information and ad vice from many expert areas. 
Professionals in the union movement should hâve adéquate oppor-
tunities to gain a sensé of pride, prestige and importance from their 
work by serving in a professional manner that helps unions attain their 
goals without corrupting their démocratie processes. Union research 
officers should be professionally trained in économies and related 
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disciplines. The labour movement should, in its own interests, promote 
the professional dignity and safeguard the professional status of its 
research officers so that they may serve the unions most effectively and 
efficiently in a proper advisory and consultative relationship. 
However gratifying it may seem, I think that a professional in the 
union movement should avoid trying to corner a monopoly of expert 
skills and technical knowledge. Union men are against this as well as 
against other sorts of monopoly. And so they should be. It narrows 
the potential scope of professional contributions to the development 
of démocratie unionism. It serves only to strengthen a persistent anti-
intellectual bias and a suspicion of experts. 
Rather, the expert should try to transmit his knowledge and help 
develop the skills of the non-professional staff and elected officers. In 
a sensé his aim should be to work himself out of a job. A research 
officer must scrupulously avoid making décisions which are the legiti-
mate function of union members and elected officers. His aim must 
be to make them less dépendent on experts and not more so. He must 
not become involved in the internai conflicts and controversies of 
unions in a way that might undermine their démocratie processes and 
that would destroy his professional advisory and consultative relation-
ships. 
It is the research officer's duty to give the elected officers and the 
negotiating committees, when they are engaged in collective bargaining, 
the best économie advice possible and to give it in a clear and précise 
manner so that it can be readily understood and used. The better the 
économie advice and its présentation, the easier it is for the decision-
makers to make the right décisions and to obtain the necessary support 
of their members. 
The research officer should complète his investigation of the firm 
and industry (in relation to gênerai économie conditions and trends), 
collect and analyze the relevant information and give his recommenda-
tions and advice to the union negotiators before they décide upon the 
bargaining goals. As a resuit of his studies he may be able to call 
attention to matters that could hâve a bearing on bargaining stratégies 
in the short, médium and long terms. He should try to clarify long-run 
objectives which for the front-line fighters tend to become blurred in 
the heat of battle. 
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We know that économies is not a précise science. We must there-
fore constantly strive to improve our own skills and the quality of the 
tools and materials with which we work. Confidence in the reliability 
of our analyses and advice must grow as we succeed in reducing the 
margins of error. We must maintain a high degree of pressure on 
government agencies to obtain more authoritative statistics, to improve 
their quality and to fill the gaps. At the same rime we must hâve some 
sensé of priority about where we should concert our pressures so that 
the most urgent needs will be met first. 
Considérable attention has been drawn recently to the need for 
better information on labour supply and demand, by occupation, 
industry and locality. The Economie Council of Canada in particular 
has made valuable contributions in emphasizing the needs for improved 
labour market information among other manpower policies to facilitate 
mobility and raise productivity. The related needs for information on 
the rémunération of labour and management, however, escape attention. 
The studies and discussions of the labour market generally appear to 
treat the labour market, unlike other markets, as though it operated 
without a price function. Attention must be given to the needs for 
improvement in the quality and quantity of statistical data and analyses 
on rémunération: wages and salaries plus « fringe benefits » for ail 
occupations including the managerial, technical and professional. 
Because the work of the Economie Council has received rnuch of 
our attention recently, it provides a convenient illustration of our concern 
with the improvement of statistical information and économie analyses. 
It should reveal also something of labour's interest in thèse matters. 
An implicit assumption that runs through the CounciTs Second 
Annual Review is that income différences are either caused by or 
justified by productivity différences. In any event, the Review 
repeatedly and explicitly relates income différences to productivity dif-
férences. Several inconsistent measures of productivity are used and 
most of them are incomplète, in that productivity is measured by 
various types of income. Because productivity is frequently defined 
in terms of income, therefore the income différences actually are either 
justified or explained by themselves. The exercise really becomes quite 
absurd. 
The best of the incomplète measures of productivity used by the 
Economie Council is net national income at factor cost, per employed 
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person. « The real income différence per person in the labour force 
between the two countries » is equated with the différence in « average 
productivity » between Canada and the United States.1 Because capital 
cost allowances and indirect taxes are excluded, net national income 
covers only about three quarters of Canada's Gross National Product. 
As a measure of productivity it is incomplète. Such a restricted view 
of productivity would give government and business a large eut of the 
production pie before labours share of the remaining production (na-
tional income) could be considered. For example: in 1964, indirect 
taxes (less subsidies) were 13.5 per cent of Canada's Gross National 
Product, compared to only 9.4 per cent in the U.S.; and capital cost 
allowances took 11.9 per cent of our GNP, compared to only 8.9 per 
cent in the U.S. 
Further, « the higher quality of labour in the United States in terms 
of the relatively much higher level of educational attainment », according 
to the Second Annual Review 2 « has been calculated in very rough terms 
to account for well over a third of the productivity différences ». But 
how are the productivity différences to be determined as between 
persons? Of course, the productivity différences between levels of 
éducation are measured by the différences in the incomes of persons at 
those levels. If productivity différences are income différences, then 
incomes are différent because incomes are différent. This is tautology. 
It may be also a fallacy of misplaced concreteness. 
The Economie Council has used some even narrower measures of 
productivity than net national income. « Per capita personal income 
is also a measure of comparative productivity... » 3 And futher: 
« Average earned income per person employed provides us with a rough 
measure of productivity per worker ».4 
Of course, per capita personal income is not a measure of producti-
vity at ail. First, it divides personal income among the whole population, 
including ail those who contributed nothing towards the production. 
Secondly, personal income is an even narrower measure than net national 
income because it excludes an even larger portion of the gross national 
product by removing ail non-personal incomes such as dividends, interest 
and rents going to other than persons. 
( 1 ) Second Annual Review, page 58. 
(2) The same. 
(3) Second Annual Review, page 100. 
(4) Second Annual Review, page 117. 
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Narrower still is the productivity measure based on average earned 
income per person employed because it excludes ail but the labour 
income, on the unrealistic assumption that labour gets either ail or a 
constant share of the total value of production. 
How productivity is measured is a critical matter of concern to the 
unions because it cannot be separated from the problems and policies 
relating to the détermination and distribution of incomes. Particularly 
because the Economie Council has given great prominence to the rela-
tionships between incomes and productivity for public policy considéra-
tions, the union research officiais are compelled to give thèse questions 
careful considération. 
To be fair, the Economie Council has used better measures of 
productivity apart from those which are used in the considération of 
income différences between Canada and the U.S., between régions, 
and between persons at différent levels of educational attainment. The 
measures of productivity growth used in the analysis of the economy's 
performance and potential output are based on the volume of Gross 
Domestic Product in relation to civilian employment. * 
* Second Animal Review, page 16. 
It appears that the Council underestimates the productivity growth 
rate in the non-agricultural private sector of the economy. (See Table 
A). In any event the Council does not attempt to présent any évidence 
to persuade us that it measures productivity more reliably than the 
D.B.S. We are led to suspect, however, that the Council exaggerates 
the inadequacy of Canada's productivity performance. 
TABLE A 
MEASURES OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH COMPARED : ESTIMÂTES OF DOMINION BUREAU 
OF STATISTICS AND THE ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA 
Average Annual Percentage Increase 
1950-55 1955-60 
ECOC : 1 non agricultural output per person in 
non agricultural employment 2.3 0.4 
DBS : 2 output per person employed in 
commercial non-agricultural 
industries 2.9 1.8 
output per man-hour in commercial 
non-agricultural industries 3.7 2.4 
output per man-hour in manufacturing 3.9 2.5 
output per employed person 
in manufacturing 3.0 2.3 
1—Second Annual Review, page 16. 
2—Indexes of Output per Person Employed and Per Man-hour in Canada, Com-
mercial Non-agricultural Industries, 1947-63. 
(Catalogue No. 14-501 Occasional). 
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The Economie Council leaves no doubt that it gives productivity 
growth a place of central importance for the attainment of Canada's 
social and économie goals. The Second Annual Review repeats the 
emphasis of the First: « productivity gains are the essence of économie 
growth and the real source of improvements in the living standards 
within any nation ».5 « The strength of Canada's compétitive position, 
as reflected in its international trade, is ultimately related, especially 
under a fixed exchange System, to the economy's relative performance 
in productivity and in priées and costs ».6 « The most important current 
problem is to achieve and maintain adéquate productivity growth. This 
is the key to économie growth and to rising living standards for Cana-
dians ».7 «... a stronger advance in productivity is now called for if 
wage and profit conditions favourable to sustained growth are to be 
maintained ».8 
This is the thème throughout the Review: productivity appears as 
monotheistic goddess, the fertile provider of ail social and économie 
goodies. 
Paradoxically, the exaggerated importance and prominence for the 
national economy which the Economie Council gives to productivity 
stems from its narrow view of productivity. By restricting its considéra-
tions of productivity to physical rather than value terms (going as far 
as relating changes in money wages to changes in physical productivity), 
it excludes considération of the bénéficiai effect of higher export priées 
which can also be a « real source of improvements in the living standards 
within any nation », particularly for a nation with an open economy. 
Certainly for an economy as open as Canada's, which exports more than 
a fifth of its GNP in trade for imports, we cannot afford to neglect the 
important influence that our terms of trade (the priées of the things we 
export compared to the priées of the things we import) can hâve not 
only upon our standard of living, but also upon our economy's potentials 
for growth and its actual performance. 
We don't dispute the claim that the priées for Canadas exports 
must be compétitive with the priées charged by other countries for the 
same goods. Undoubtedly, we will not be able to sell our goods if we 
(5) Pages 15-16. 
(6) Page 23. 
(7) Page 33. 
(8) Page 35. 
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overcharge for them. We must challenge, however, the exaggerated 
claims for making Canada's priées more compétitive in international 
trade. The Economie Council has been a respected contributor to such 
exaggerations which create the erroneous impression that réductions 
in the priées for our exports and increases in the priées for our imports 
are bénéficiai for Canada. This fallacy has been given popular currency. 
It indicates the challenges and the responsibilities for economists in the 
unions and elsewhere in respect to the économie éducation of their 
members and the public. 
No doubt productivity gains are a necessary condition for économie 
growth and improvements in living standards, but economists must 
emphasize that productivity gains are not the sufficient and exclusive 
condition. If we can produce more nickel, copper, newsprint or wheat 
per man hour of work, Canada should be better off as long as we can 
buy as much oranges, grapefruits, coffee, bananas, or other things with 
a pound of nickel or copper, or a ton of newsprint or wheat. However, 
Canada's welfare is increased not only by productivity gains, but also 
by the higher priées it can get for the things our country produces for 
export, relative to the priées it must pay for its imports. Productivity 
and other things being equal, an increase in the priées for exports, or a 
decrease in the priées of our imports, will improve Canada's welfare, 
making more goods and services available for consumption or investment, 
raising the potentials for économie growth and improvements in living 
standards. The potential benefits of physical productivity gains can be 
offset by détériorations in the terms of trade, or they can be supple-
mented by improvements in Canada's terms of trade. 
The implication for wage policies is that value productivity, rather 
than physical productivity, is the most appropriate and équitable éco-
nomie considération in the détermination of labour's share of output. 
Guidelines which restrict wage increases to gains in physical productivity 
condemn labour to a declining share of the value of output. If workers 
are to get a fair share in terms of the Economie CounciTs goal of « an 
équitable distribution of rising incomes », they must get their share 
of the benefits accruing from price increases as well as from the physical 
productivity gains. 
In pressing the case for a « more internationally compétitive eco-
nomy », the Economie Council créâtes the impression that price réduc-
tions for our exports and priées increases for our imports are unmixed 
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blessings. However, the benefits of the increased volume of exports 
that may be attributable to the dévaluation of the Canadian dollar were 
offset by the losses from the less favourable ternis of trade. During 
the period 1959 to 1963, the Index of Export Priées (1948 as 100) 
increased 5 per cent compared to a rise of 13.1 per cent for the Index 
of Import Priées. Our terms of trade (the Index of Export Priées as a 
per cent of the Index of Import Priées), therefore, declined by 7.2 per 
cent. (See Table B). Thus, a large part of the potential growth benefits 
which were made possible by the gains in physical productivity for the 
economy were eroded by the less favourable terms of trade. 
In the subséquent period, 1963-65, Canada's terms of trade improved 
by 1.9 per cent: export priées increased 3.3 per cent compared to a rise 
of 1.4 per cent for import priées. This improvement in our trading 
terms makes possible a larger increase in real wages and living standards 
than what could be obtained solely by the productivity gains. 
TABLE B 
CANADA'S TERMS OF TRADE : 1958-1965 
1948 = 100 
Index of Export Index of Import Index of Terms 
Prices Prices of Trade 
120.6 116.5 103.5 
122.8 114.4 107.3 
123.0 115.5 108.5 
124.0 119.1 104.1 
128.1 124.5 102.9 
128.9 129.4 99.6 
130.7 130.8 99.9 
133.1 131.2 101.4 
105.0 113.1 92.8 
103.3 101.4 101.8 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1959-1963 
1963-1965 
Source : D.B.S. 
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LES FONCTIONS DES CHERCHEURS DANS 
LES ORGANISATIONS SYNDICALES 
L'activité du service de recherche d'une organisation syndicale dépend des 
préoccupations qui l'animent et des objectifs qu'elle poursuit. 
Le Service des recherches des € Métallurgistes unis d'Amérique » étudie certes 
des questions d'intérêt général, telles la réforme de la fiscalité, la politique écono-
mique et sociale, la planification économique et sociale, les problèmes de main-
d'oeuvre liés au développement technologique et à Tautomation, mais l'essentiel 
de ces travaux est consacré à la recherche et à la mise en forme de données immé-
diatement utilisables dans l'action syndicale quotidienne centrée sur l'organisation, 
la négociation collective et l'application de la convention collective. Les informa-
tions concernant les salaires, les conditions de travail, les bénéfices marginaux, la 
situation économique et financière des entreprises, l'évolution de l'emploi seront 
rassemblées, étudiées puis diffusées aux organisateurs et aux négociateurs. 
Par ailleurs, le personnel des services de la recherche est de plus en plus 
étroitement associé à la préparation des décisions que les dirigeants élus de l'orga-
nisation sont appelés à prendre. Cette situation peut présenter certains risques pour 
la Démocratie syndicale notamment lorsque les « professionnels » employés par 
l'organisation syndicale en raison de leur compétence sont tentés d'exercer les respon-
sabilités qui appartiennent aux élus. 
La prévention de cette difficulté suppose que les fonctions de ces professionnels 
soient clairement définies. Si le mouvement ouvrier est en droit d'attendre d'eux 
des recommandations pertinentes et un respect fidèle des décisions prises par les 
organismes directeurs, il doit en revanche reconnaître leur dignité professionnelle 
et considérer avec attention leurs avis. 
Un effort particulier doit être fait dans le domaine de la recherche économique 
sans sousestimer la portée des travaux entrepris par le Conseil Economique du 
Canada, il semble que ceux-ci devraient être complétés et étendus à d'autres aspects. 
Cest ainsi que ces disparités de revenus ne peuvent être expliquées par les seules 
disparités de productivité physique. En d'autres termes, l'augmentation des revenus 
des salariés ne saurait dépendre de la seule augmentation de la productivité du 
travail, il est notamment souhaitable et possible que ces travailleurs participent 
largement aux bénéfices réalisés par les entreprises, sans pour autant compromettre 
les exportations canadiennes par une augmentation des prix. 
